From the inception of the proportional representation movement it has been an issue whether larger parties are favored at the expense of smaller parties in one apportionment of seats as compared to another apportionment. A number of methods have been proposed and are used in countries with a proportional representation system. These apportionment methods exhibit a regularity of order, as discussed in the present paper, that captures the preferential treatment of larger versus smaller parties. This order, namely majorization, permits the comparison of seat allocations in two apportionments. For divisor methods, we show that one method is majorized by another method if and only if their signpost ratios are increasing. This criterion is satisfied for the divisor methods with power-mean rounding, and for the divisor methods with stationary rounding. Majorization places the five traditional apportionment methods in the order as they are known to favor larger parties over smaller parties: Adams, Dean, Hill, Webster, and Je¤erson.
Introduction
Payment in proportion to usage, or payment in proportion to services rendered is a well-established and accepted principle. In the political context, the counterpart is proportional representation. One instance is the apportionment of a number of seats to each party proportionally to the number of votes received; another, the apportionment of a number of seats to each state proportionally to the population counts. In the case of monetary payments there appears to be little discourse on methodology methods. In contrast, electoral apportionment has led to political controversy and bitter battles.
I. Olkin gratefully acknowledges support of the Alexander von Humboldt-Foundation.
From its inception in the Constitutional Congress of 1787 in the United States, and from the proportional representation movement in Europe that came into existence before 1900, alternative methods for electoral apportionment have been proposed. Why is there a problem? For monetary payments money is considered a practically infinitely divisible commodity, and we are able to allocate arbitrary fractions. This is not the case for electoral apportionments. Each seat is a single entity, and the gain or loss of an individual seat is usually considered of significant importance by the political antagonists.
From the very beginning there has been the issue whether, of two competing apportionment methods, one favors larger parties at the expense of smaller parties more than the other. The rival apportionment methods are associated with well-known names -Thomas Je¤erson, Alexander Hamilton, John Quincy Adams, Daniel Webster, to name but a few. For an excellent introduction to the history and mathematical formulation of the subject, we recommend the seminal monograph by Balinski and Young (2001) .
In order to set the stage for the exposition that follows, we refer to the example exhibited in Table 1 . A perusal of this example shows a regularity in the ordering from apportionment m A to apportionment m J , capturing the preferential treatment of larger parties versus smaller parties. Apportionment m A consistently favors smaller parties, in comparison with apportionment m J which favors larger parties; the other apportionments lie in-between.
What is clear from Table 1 is that there is a movement uphill from apportionment m A to apportionment m J . At each step there is a transfer of one seat. The question is how to capture the structural implications of these transfers. Di¤erent descriptions of the move from one column to the next could be conceived. The ordering proposed in the present paper is called majorization. It has the advantage of providing a complete characterization, and has its roots in studies of equality and inequality. For a review of its history and its formal properties see Marshall and Olkin (1979) ; an earlier influential forerunner is the book on inequalities by Hardy et al. (1934) . In the electoral lit- 10 10 10 10 10 11 25 178 9 9 9 9 10 9 1 9 9 5 1 7 7 7 8 7 7 1 4 6 1 0 5 5 6 5 5 5 9 2 2 5 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 9 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 100 000 36 36 36 36 36 36
The apportionment in any column leads to the apportionment in the next column by the transfer of one seat from a smaller party to a larger party, as is indicated by the arrows.
